Buffalo Law Review
Volume 23

Number 3

Article 13

4-1-1974

The Local and Unified Services Act—An Analysis of State and
County Funding for New York State's Community Mental Healh
Services
Linda Connor Kane

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview
Part of the Law and Psychology Commons, Legislation Commons, and the Mental and Social Health
Commons

Recommended Citation
Linda C. Kane, The Local and Unified Services Act—An Analysis of State and County Funding for New York
State's Community Mental Healh Services, 23 Buff. L. Rev. 785 (1974).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol23/iss3/13

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

THE LOCAL AND UNIFIED SERVICES ACT-AN ANALYSIS OF
STATE AND COUNTY FUNDING FOR NEW YORK STATE'S
COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES*
INTRODUCTION

The Local and Unified Services Act was passed by the New York
State legislature on June 11, 1973.1 It represents an effort to integrate
by law two evolving trends in the mental health field. By using a system of financial incentives, the legislature has developed a scheme
which will enable state and county mental health services to become
a single planning unit, responsible for serving all county residents.
The state mental health system began as a network of total care
institutions. The state assumed responsibility for the care and treatment of the mentally ill in the 1840s, when reformers like Dorothea
Dix persuaded humanitarians that local communities, which had been
responsible for the care of the mentally ill, could no longer do the
job.2 State hospitals for the mentally ill and state schools for the mentally retarded represented a concept of treatment in isolated settings
based on the idea that separation of the patient from his mentally disturbing social situation was best for him and for society. "The population treated by the hospitals was characteristically viewed as needy
but vaguely undeserving." 3 In fact, the state hospital system reflected
the social Darwinism of its day. Those who deviated from the norm
were considered casualties of the system of natural selection and were
isolated from the mainstream of life. The treatment represented an
all-or-nothing approach to mental illness. 4 The end result of this categoricial philosophy was the creation of a separate and forgotten population. State hospitals became "dumping grounds" for the most hope*The author would like to express her appreciation to Samuel Rabkin, J.D., for
his comments on the substance of this comment, and to Dr. Jack Zusman, SUNYAB
School of Medicine, Department of Community Psychiatry, and Dr. James Warde,
Commissioner Erie County Department of Mental Health, for their help in formulating
the issues.
1. N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAw §§ 11.01-.33 (McKinney Supp. 1973) [hereinafter
cited as LUSA].
2. R. BARDACH, TnE SKILL FACTOR IN POLITICS 30 (1972).
3. Id.
4. Rossi, Some Pre-World War II Antecedents of Community Mental Health
Theory and Practice,in PERSPECTIVES IN COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTR 10 (A. Bindman
& A. Spiegel eds. 1969).
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less patients, and those committed under this usually involuntary
procedure were maintained by custodial treatment.r In recent years,
the New York State Department of Mental Hygiene has come to realize the inadequacy of the system and has encouraged hospitals to reduce patient stays, to group patients by place of residence rather than
by severity of diagnosis and to offer more alternatives to long-term
care.6
Since 1900, a separate system of outpatient mental health services
has been developing. A number of authors have suggested various
origins for the community mental health movement.7 Its primary
tenets are the provision of diagnostics and short-term treatment within
the client's community.8 Proponents of the community mental health
approach view mental illness as a crisis period which must be diagnosed and treated as quickly as possible in order to return the person
to normal life within the community. Community treatment emphasizes short-term therapy with a restricted use of hospitalization.D
In New York until 1954 the community mental health movement
was represented primarily by private agencies. In that year New York
passed the Community Mental Health Services Act1 ° which provided
5.
We have recognized that much of what was formerly described as the clinical
picture of the chronic schizophrenic is not at all the inevitable outcome of
the disease process. Rather, it is the inevitable outcome of prolonged hospitalization. The chronic, deteriorated, alienated schizophrenic patient who vegetates in the back wards of our many state hospitals is the final outcome of an
iatrogenic condition resulting from prolonged hospitalization superimposed on
schizophrenic illness.
Mendel, Effect of Length of Hospitalization on Rate and Quality of Remission from
Acute Psychotic Episode, 143 J. OF NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASES 226 (1966); see
JOINT COMMISSION ON MENTAL ILLNESS & HEALTH, ACTION FOR MENTAL HEALTH
47-48 (1961) [hereinafter cited as JOINT COMMISSION].
6. M. HARDING, COOPERATION BETWEEN COUNTY AND CITY GOVERNMENTS AS A
COUNTY GOVERNMENT CONCERN 9 (Problems of County Management Series No. 8,

August 1, 1973).

7. Sei Dunham, Community Psychiatry: The Newest Therapeutic Bandwagon,
54-55 (A. Bindman & A. Spiegel
eds. 1969); Hobbs, Mental Health's Third Revolution, in PERSPECTIVES IN COMMUNITY
MENTAL HEALTH, 29 passim (A. Bindman & A. Spiegel eds. 1969); Rossi, supra note
4, at 9 passim.
8. See JOINT CoMMISSION 169-73.
9. On the federal level, President John F. Kennedy emphasized the need for community mental health services in a special message to Congress on February 5, 1963.
PUBLIC PAPERS OF PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 126-37 (1964). The 88th Conin

PERSPECTIVES IN COMMa UNITY MENTAL HEALTH

gress responded by passing the Community Mental Health Centers Act, 42 U.S.C.

2681-88 (1963).
10. N.Y. MENTAL

CMHSA].

HYGIENE LAW

§§

§ 190 (McKinney 1971) [hereinafter cited as

COMMENTS

additional funding for community-based programs in the public sector by sharing state funds on a matching basis with local or county
funds. The results of this act were extremely uneven. Some counties
were very involved and used a substantial amount of local money to
provide extensive mental health facilities; others continued to rely
primarily on the state to provide services.1 In counties where the services did develop under the shared funding, programs and state services were diversified due to governmental encouragement, and the
lines of treatment responsibility blurred. As a result, many services
were duplicated, patients could not move readily from one system to
the other and the effectiveness of health care programs was diminished
by a lack of coordination.
It was the emergence and development of the two systems that
led to the legislative initiative for the LUSA. LUSA is primarily
enabling legislation which provides a method of joint state and local
funding of mental health services based on joint planning and coordination. It also acts as an incentive to make the provision of community-based programs financially attractive to the counties. In his
statement of support for the legislation former Governor Nelson
Rockefeller noted:
The Unified Services Bill is an attempt to restructure the system
of providing mental health care in New York to make better use of
the combined resources of State and local communities for the planning, delivery and financing of mental health services, and to remove cost difference as a major obstacle to the2 development of effective local community mental health programs.'
This Comment will examine the provisions of the 1954 Community Mental Health Services Act and the 1973 Local and Unified Services Act. The 1973 Act will be compared to the Short-Doyle Act,13 a
California statute enacted" in 1969, which is similar in background and
design. The potential effectiveness of the New York law will be analyzed in light of the subsequent history of the California Act. It should
be noted that LUSA is legislation with a state-wide effect. Due to the
differences in county population and the existing mental health programs, it is to be expected that there will be widely divergent effects
11. See notes 24-26 infra & accompanying text.
12. Memorandum by Nelson Rockefeller, Governor of New York, June 11, 1973, in
[1973] Laws of New York 2347.
13. CAL. WEL. & INST. CODE §§ 5600-5765 (West,1972).
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in the various counties of the state. Therefore, questions will be raised
as to whether mental health funding is an appropriate subject for
legislation or whether new legislation is necessary to effectuate the
Act's objectives.
I. THE COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH SERVIcEs Act

4

A. Provisionsof the 4ct
CMHSA was the state's first effort to implement mental health
services under a shared funding program. The original purpose of the
act was limited. It was
designed to encourage the development of preventive, rehabilitative
and treatment services through new community mental health programs, [and] the improvement and expansion of existing community
services.1 5

The program of community mental health services could be set
up by a city or a county 6 by creating a Community Mental Health
Board (CMHB) with nine members.' 7 The basic function of the
Board was to oversee the administration of community mental health
services.' 8 The Director of the Community Mental Health Service was
the executive officer of the board with responsibility for direct supervision of services provided.' 9
14. N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 190 (McKinney 1971).
15. Id. § 190(2). The scope of the Act was broadened in 1958 to include persons
with various types of diagnoses. Act of March 26, 1958, ch. 380, § 1, [1958] Laws of
New York 1048, as amended, Act of April 5, 1972, ch. 108, § 1, [1972] Laws of New
York 931. In 1961, it required the integration of services on a community, regional and
state-wide basis in order to avoid duplication. Act of April 3, 1961, ch. 281, § 1, [1961]
Laws of New York 420.
16. N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 190-a (McKinney 1971).
17. Id. § 190-b. Seven members of the board were appointed by the executive
branch of the creating government; the other two members were the Commissioners of
Social Services and Health who served ex officio.
18. Id. § 190-c. Their broad-based powers included the review and evaluation of
programs, the execution of programs within the appropriate budget, contracting for the
provision of service, the establishment of rules and regulations and the appointment
of a director.
19. Id. § 190-d. His duties included recommending programs to the board, encouragement of the development and expansion of preventive, rehabilitative and treatment programs, making an annual report and conducting appropriate studies. A recent
amendment to the law which comports with the increasing emphasis on agency coordination makes the director a member of the regional Mental Health Advisory Committee.
Act of April 3, 1961, ch. 281, § 3, [1961] Laws of New York 421.

COMMENTS

The financial plan under this Act required the creating governmental unit to establish a GMHB 20 and the board to provide for at
least one of the following services:
(a) community mental health and retardation facilities;
(b) inpatient and outpatient services in community mental health
and retardation facilities, in general hospitals and in non-profit
licensed private institutions;
(c) rehabilitation services for persons suffering from psychiatric
disorders ... ;

(d) consultant and education
services furnished by qualified men21
tal health personnel.

Once the requirements were met, the state reimbursed the
22
county for 50 percent of the operating costs for the listed services.
In order to provide an incentive for smaller communities (those with
a population of less than 200,000) there was a 75 percent reimbursement for the first $100,000 spent on mental health services.2 3
B. The Impact of the Act

An analysis of the CMHSA is difficult because of the differences
among the counties. By 1973, some counties made optimum use of
the state funds and designated a substantial budget allocation to the
mental health program.24 Other counties allocated nearly nothing to
the program 2 5 The average local expenditure was $3.38. 6 Some
counties began programs almost immediately, but by 1960 only 25
counties and New York City were participating, and by 1966 only 45
counties and New York City. It was not until 1971 that each county
had a CMHB and many programs were best described as token, in20.
21.
22.
23.

N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAw

§ 191 (McKinney 1971).

Id.
Id. § 191-a.
Id.

24. Based on a per capita amount, the areas using the greatest amount of local
funds were: New York City, $5.46; Allegany County, $4.28; Westchester County, $4.02.
SUBCOMM. ON MENTAL HYGIENE, ASSEMBLY STANDING COMM. ON HEALTH, REPORT ON

SERVICES, 196th N.Y. Legis., Table II (1973) [hereinafter
SUBCOMM. REPORT].
25. The counties expending the lowest per capita amount were
Washington, $.08; Otsego, $.12; Warren, $.15; Livingstone, $.24. Id.
26. The mean expenditure is substantially raised by the New York
The median amount spent by the counties on mental health services was

UNIFIED

Id.

cited as N.Y.
Hamilton, $0;
City allocation.
$.71 per capita.
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adequately supported and insufficient to meet county needs.2 7 Part of
the counties' reluctance may have been the result of the financial disincentive which was inherent in the dual system. If the county sent a
patient to a state hospital rather than treating him locally, the state
assumed the entire cost. If he was treated in the community, the
county had to assume 50 percent of the cost.28 In smaller communities

where there were less professional staff and a lower tax base, the state
hospital alternative which was entirely state-funded, had the effect of
substantially decreasing the need for the counties to develop their own
care system. In addition, since the law was primarily enabling legislation without a clear mandate on what services to provide and how to
provide them, and since the state hospitals had an already established
role in the mental health care system and a substantial source of state
funding, it was difficult for the less well-defined and more poorly
funded local programs to establish themselves in a number of counties.
However, such data does not reflect the entire picture. New York
City and some of the larger counties, such as Erie and Monroe, initiated fairly extensive programs. During the years after 1954, a number
of agencies were created to provide specialized services. At the 1971
annual conference of New York State Community Mental Health
Boards, Deputy Commissioner Robert Patton reported:
If we measured community program in terms of budget, gross
approved programs increased from 149 million in 1969 to 187 million in 1970....
There were 483 different facilities in operation in the community program in 1970. These include 11 mental health centers,
21 other multi-component facilities, 285 clinics, 48 day training centers, 31 inpatient units and 16 partial hospitalization facilities ...
plus a wide variety of other facilities.
There were about 224,000 admissions to these 483 facilities during 1970.29

As these programs grew, the need for coordination with state facilities
became evident in order to avoid duplication of services. Thus the
regional planning committees were begun.
A simple assessment of the success or failure of CMHSA is not
possible. While it is possible to point to a number of excellent pro27. Id. at 1.
28. Bodin, Carroll & Lee, FinancingMental Health Services in the State of New
York, 20 OPERATIONS RESEARCH 942, 943 (1972).
29. M. HARDING, supra note 6, at 7.
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grams which were initiated under the Act, it had at least one serious
drawback. It allowed, and in fact encouraged, a dual system of care
which presented programming as well as administrative difficulties. In
order to increase the coordination of care and to help develop better
services in the counties, the legislature began an inquiry into alternative systems.
C. The Path to the New Law
In a letter to members of the Health Committee, Mental Hygiene Subcommittee Chairman Robert C. Wertz noted that
[t]he State's initial commitment to development of local services
came with the adoption of the Community Mental Health Services
Act in 1954. However, the momentum has been lost and new approaches are needed to spark community initiative 3 0
The legislative effort to create a unified system of services was introduced in the 1971 session. The concept of unified services basically
involves totalling the cost of all mental health services provided for
residents of the county, whether funded by the state or county, and
dividing the amount by some specified ratio to determine each government's share. The combination of funding requires a coordination of
planning and programming. The New York City Health Services Administration developed a bill which suggested an optional plan for unified services. If a county decided to join the plan, the state would pay
90 percent of the cost and the county would pay 10 percent. 31 In early
1972, the Governor proposed an 87:13 ratio for sharing all costs except
for the cost of maintaining hospital patients in residence five years or
longer.32 In 1972, the legislature amended and recodified the 1954 law
to incorporate a change in the planning procedures but maintained
the 50:50 funding ratio.3 3 While the 1972 changes theoretically had
the advantage of simplicity, they proved discriminatory when applied
to the varying conditions throughout the-state.
Under any of the above plans almost all the counties would have
30. N.Y. SUBCOMM. REPORT.

31. Id. at 3.
32. Id. at 4.

33. Act of May 9, 1972, ch. 251, §§ 11.01-.29, [1972] Laws of New York 483-88.
The effect of the recodification was to make the statute more specific and descriptive. In
order to promote simplicity this recodification will be treated as an expansion of the
1954 Jaw.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
lost money.3 4 In order to make unified services more attractive, the
Assembly Ways and Means Committee requested a research team from
the State University of New York at Stonybrook to develop an alternative plan.3 5 It was fundamentally the plan suggested by this research
team that became the Local and Unified Services Act of 1973.
The legislative report indicated that the Act was "[i]n response to
the need for an integrated service program, free of fiscal disadvantages
for any components of mental health care
.
,,s0 In summary, the
Governor noted:
Perhaps of even greater significance is the coordinated planning
process that will be provided by the bill. Substantial headway has
already been made in achieving joint State-local planning for mental
health services. The procedure for developing a unified services plan
under this bill should produce even greater coordination and should
help to insure that gaps in the types of delivery system available
37
in participating communities are eliminated.
II.

THE LoCAL AND UNIFIED SERvICEs AcT38

A. Purpose
The purpose of LUSA differs in emphasis from that of its predecessor. The Act is designed to enable the local government to develop
a broad range of services. In order to develop these services the local
government is to be given the opportunity to participate in the planning and delivery of such services. The Act also states:
The unified services system will strengthen the state and local partnership in the determination of the need for and the allocation of
services and more easily provide for the most effective and economical
utilization of new and existing state, local governmental, and private
resources to provide services. A uniform ratio of state and local government responsibility for financing services under a unified services
plan is established by this article to elminate having the types of services provided in a community be determined by the local government's share of the cost of a particular program rather than the needs
of the community. 9
34. N.Y. SuncoMM. REPORT.
35. Bodin, Carroll &Lee, supra note 28.
36. N.Y. Suncomm. REPxOr.
37. Memorandum by Nelson Rockefeller, supra note 12, at 2348.

38. N.Y. MENTAL
39. Id. § 11.01.

HYGIENE LAW

§§ 11.01-.33 (McKinney Supp. 1973).
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B. Administrationof the Act
The basic responsibility for the administration of LUSA usually
falls on county government. As under the 1954 law, the local government is required to establish an identifiable entity in the local government's hierarchy to be responsible for the provision of service. 40 The
local governmental unit is comprised of the Community Mental
41
Health, Mental Retardation and Alcoholism Board, and a director.4
The policymaking power vests in the Board unless the county has a
43
charter which changes the power distribution.
The powers and responsibilities for community mental health
services are granted to the local governmental unit and then divided
between the Board and the director. The duties of the local governmental unit are specific and are directly in line with the purposes of
the Act. The key functions are to:
1. review services and facilities of the area, to determine needs,
to encourage programs of prevention, diagnosis, care and treatment
and to provide social, rehabilitative and vocational aid;
2. develop medium and long range goals and plans with priorities
for service;
3. plan with state department facilities and contract for services
with goals of LUSA in mind;
4. be sure that all population groups are adequately served and
that there is cooperation and coordination, with continuity of care;
and
5. have the power to establish procedures for execution of all
plans and contracts, to see that they are carried out, as well as generally supervise and administrate the plan. 44
40. Id. § 11.05(a).
41. Id. § 11.05(b) [hereinafter
42. Id.

cited as Board].

§ 11.05(c).

43. Id. The arrangements in a charter government are exemplified by Erie County.
Article XI-B of the Erie County Charter [amended Local Law No. 4-1967] establishes
a Department of Mental Health which has a commissioner as its head, appointed by
the county's executive. It further establishes the Mental Health Board to serve in an
advisory capacity. It is expected that such a division of power will remain as Erie
County enters the unified services program. ERIE COUNTY, N.Y. CHrARTER, art. XI-B, §2
11-B-01 to -03 (1967).
44. N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW §§ 11.13(a)(1)-(13) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
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C. FinancialAspects of the Act
There are two options for the local government under LUSA: it
may remain under the old law, which is now called the Local Services
Plan, or it may switch to the new provision, the Unified Services
Plan.45 Under either plan state aid will be available for the net operating costs of the service. 46 Both plans require the formulation of longrange goals and annual plans for comprehensive service.4 7 As a condition of renewal of the plans, reasonable efforts must be made by the
county to provide extended or improved service.48 Both plans also require the local governmental unit to establish a fee schedule for clinical services which meets with the approval of the Department of
Mental Hygiene Commissioner. 0
The Local Services Plan50 continues the same shared basis of
funding as the 1954 Act. One half of the net operating expenses incurred by the local government and voluntary agencies will be reimbursed.
The Unified Services Plan 5' requires considerably more prerequisites in order for a community to gain funding. A county adopting the unified system must draw up a plan which represents a team
effort by the agencies that provide mental health, mental retardation and alcoholism services to develop service for all persons from
the area. 52 There are specific criteria the Commissioner of Mental Hygiene must consider in granting approval to the local plans. They include considering whether the plan complies with the statute and regulations and whether it arranges for the most effective and economical
provision of services. The commissioner must examine the planning
aspects to be sure that there has been participation and coordination
between consumer groups, providers of service, state facilities and
county organizations. In addition, review and evaluation standards
53
must be established within the plan.

The plan itself must include a proposal for services and finances
based on the county's predetermined service priorities and inter45. Id. § 11.14(i).

46. Id.§ 11.15(a).
47. Id. § 11.15(b).
48. Id. § 11.15(c).
49. Id. § 11.25(a).

50. Id. § 11.17.
51. Id. §§ 11.19-.23.
52. Id. § 11.19(a).

53. Id. § 11.19(c) (6).
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mediate and long range goals. There must also be evidence of continual planning and evaluation and development of a wide range of
services for all county residents. The plan must estimate the number
of persons to be served and the specific types of services which will be
available. 54
The new aspect of the unified services program is the change in
the basis of financing. The final ratio is the result of a study commissioned by the legislature. In their report, the researchers set forth
the objectives of their funding model:
It must provide for uniform funding of patient care in local and state
programs.
It must encourage the development of local programs for mentalhealth care.
It must encourage fiscal responsibility in local programs. 5
The final ratio was the result of totalling the aggregate cost 56 for
the mental health services for the residents of the area. From that
amount, a population credit of $10.00 per capita for the first 100,000
people and $5.00 per capita for the remaining population is subtracted. If the aggregate costs are less than the population credit, the
costs will be completely financed by the state. If the aggregate costs
exceed the local population credit, up to $13.00 per capita will be
financed by the state on an 80:20 shared basis; all costs in excess of
57
$13.00 per capita will be reimbursed on a 65:35 basis.
54. Id. § 11.21.
55. Bodin, Carroll & Lee, supranote 28, at 943.
56. Aggregate costs are defined as the sum of net operating costs (defined in
N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE L&V § 11.03(11) (McKinney Supp. 1973) as operating costs
less revenue from sources other than state mental hygiene funds) and the costs of services rendered by state department facilities under a unified services plan. Id. § 11.23
(a). It should be noted that the present act provides that all expenses for residents
of the counties who have been in a state hospital longer than five years at the time
that the county joins the plan are paid by the state. Id. § 11.23(b) (1) (ii).
57. Id. § 11.23(b) (1). For example,
Assume: a. County X has a population of 200,000 in the 1970 census.
b. The net cost of state facilities for county residents equals $2,000,000.
c. The net cost of county programs is $800,000.
Then the aggregate cost will be $2,800,000.
The state will pay:
1. Population credit
$10 per capita for first 100,000
=$1,000,000
$ 5 per capita for population over 100,000
=
500,000
Total population credit

=$1,500,000

Footnote 57 continues on next page.

$1,500,000
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In any case in which this formula changes the amount the county
or state is presently paying, there is a provision for a "phased-in" program so that the financial burden resulting from the changed funding
ratios will not be onerous. Thus any mandated increase in local expenditures would be phased-in at the rate of 20 percent per year, the
ratio becoming fully effective in five years. Similarly, in instances
where the ratio resulted in a reduction of the local expenditures for
existing programs, the reduction would be allowed at the rate of 20
percent per year.58
The sections discussed above represent the key changes from the
1954 Act and basic provisions of the new law. Since the Act is not yet
operative, an analysis of the Act's potential impact on the mental
health system can only be made by analogy. In 1969, the California
legislature amended the Short-Doyle Act 9 to provide a similar
financing scheme in order to effect changes in the mental health system. A summary of the provisions of this Act and its operational effects
will be presented as a background for a critique of the New York law.
2. 80 percent of difference between $13 per capita
and population credit

$13 per capita
Population credit

=$2,600,000
-1,500,000
1,100,000

x .80
$ 880,000
3.

880,000

65 percent of aggregate costs above $13 per capita
Aggregate costs
=$2,800,000

$13 per capita

-

2,600,000

200,000
x .65
$ 130,000

130,000

Total state share$2,510,000
Total local share290,000
M. HARDING, supra note 6, at 17-18. Also note that under CMHSA the local share would
have been 50 percent of $800,000, or $400,000.

58. N.Y.

MENTAL HYGIENE Law

§§ 11.23(c) (2)-(3) (McKinney Supp. 1973). In

the hypothetical posed in note 57 supra, the county would have paid $400,000 and

under the new system would pay $290,000. The $110,000 difference would be phased-in
so that the state would increase its payments to the county at the rate of 20 percent
of $110,000 or $5,500 per year.

59.
S-DA].

CAL. WEL. & INST. CODE

§§ 5600-767 (West 1972) [hereinafter cited as

COMMENTS

III. THE SHORT-DOYLE ACT
A. Introduction
In 1957, the California legislature established the first version of
the Short-Doyle Act based on a shared funding ratio of 50:50.60 By
1962, the state became aware that it was supporting two systems of
health care and state officials made the long-range decisions to emphasize the S-DA system rather than the state hospital system.6 1 Several
reasons have been suggested for this decision:
1. a shift to a belief that local care is better than state institutional care, very strong in California in the mid 1960's;
2. the development of a sense that involuntary commitment
should be severely restricted and that more care should be taken to
protect the civil rights of mental patients;
3. the opposition of the conservative Reagan administration to
the direct delivery of public services, such as mental health, by the
state;
4. concern about the necessity of frequent replacement and rebuilding of state hospitals as a result of the progressively stiffer new
standards proposed by the Joint Commission on Accreditation Standards of the American Psychiatric Association;
5. a belief that it would ultimately be cheaper to treat mentally ill clients in the community than in large state institutions.6
In 1963, S-DA was amended to raise the state share of expenses to
75 percent and to include support for involuntary care as a reimbursable expenditure for the county.63 Simultaneously, the legislature
became concerned with the existing commitment procedures. Several
legislators realized that stricter procedures for commitment directed at
protecting the civil liberties of the patients would be effective only if
adequate alternatives could be provided in the community. It was both
the decision to emphasize community care through S-DA and the need
60. Act of Aug. 2, 1968, ch. 989, §§ 9000-058, [1968] Cal. Stat. 1912.

61.

DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH, LEGISLATION TO IMPLEMENT LONG RANGE

PLANS FOR MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES IN CALIFORNIA: REPORT OF LEGISLATIVE TASK
FORCE COMM. TO DIRECTOR OF MENTAL HYGIENE 2 (1963).
62. B. Barkovich, The California Short-Doyle System 21, Nov. 27, 1973 (unpublished thesis in State University of New York at Stonybrook, Department of Urban
and Policy Sciences).
63. Bradley, California Moves Rapidly to Community-Centered Mental Health
Programs Under 1967-68 Legislation, 1972 CALIF. J. 182.
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for alternatives to institutional care whicl formed the basis for the
64
present S-DA.
B. Provisions
The stated purposes of S-DA are similar to LUSA. 5 Unlike LUSA,
-it clearly differentiates the responsibilities of the Director and the
Mental Health Advisory Board. The Director has the primary executive power: he prepares the plan and supervises the provisions of mental health services.06 The Mental Health Advisory Board must approve the plan and it acts as a liaison with the local government, but
once the plan is approved the board's role becomes essentially ad67
visory.
S-DA expressly indicates the legislative intent concerning state
hospitals.
It is the intent of the Legislature that, to the extent feasible, new
and expanded services requested in the county Short-Doyle plan shall
provide alternatives to inpatient treatment. It is furthermore the intent of the Legislature that, to the extent feasible, counties that decrease their expenditures for inpatient treatment in any year below
the costs of inpatient treatment in the previous year shall receive
the amount of such decrease for new and expanded services requested in the county plan. 68
S-DA is much more explicit in stating its service priorities in the
law; the present priorities include (1) crisis intervention, (2) outpatient and day treatment, (3) partial hospitalization, (4) residential
treatment and (5) inpatient treatment. 69
The funding ratio of state to county funds is the same as the early
New York provisions, 90:10 for all mental health treatment costs.70
64. The Community Mental Health Services Division is divided into two parts. The
first part is called the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act and it is primarily concerned with
the protection of patients' civil rights. The second part is the Short-Doyle Act which
provides the financial arrangements for community services. CAL. WEL. & INST. CODE §§
5000-5767 (West 1972).
65. Id. § 5600.
66. Id. § 5608.
67. Id. § 5606.
68. Id. § 5663.
69. Id. § 5704.
70. Id. § 5705. The state maintains control of funding for the mentally retarded,
judicially committed, central office functions and research and training.
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Counties may not raise their expenditures for mental health services
more than an amount equal to one cent for each $100 in assessed value
of taxable property in order to implement the plan. 71 The plan is optional only for counties with less than 100,000 population. If the
smaller counties do not join, the state will provide voluntary care and
service for inpatients in state hospitals under the Lanterman-PetrisShort Act.72

There is a special provision and funding procedure for contract
agencies under S-DA. The Act clearly intends that these private agencies should be used and integrated into the system of outpatient care,
rehabilitation and pre- or post-care. If the county contracts with such
an agency, the state will reimburse the county for 85 percent of the
costs; the agency must provide 10 percent of the cost and the county
need only provide 5 percent of the cost.73 In New York, on the

other hand, the budgets of the contract agencies are simply included
in the operating costs of mental health care for the county.74
In California, the state does not have sole authority to approve
the county's plan as does the Department of Mental Hygiene Commissioner in New York. The directors of county programs comprise
the California Conference of Mental Health Directors which share

the responsibility for ultimate decisionmaking with the state. Adoption of the standards, rules and regulations requires the approval of
the conference by majority vote at an official session. 75
There are other minor differences between the two acts which
primarily reflect only differences in emphasis. S-DA proposals must
include a description of the procedures to be used to insure citizen
and professional involvement in county mental health planning at all
stages. 76 The California plan places even greater stress on evaluation.
The results of state-wide studies form the basis for the allocation of
special funds to target group programs which demonstrate the cost
77
effectiveness of their programs.
S-DA is an extremely detailed piece of legislation. It includes a
great number of explicit requirements and directions. The specificity
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. § 5709.5.
Id. § 5709.6.
Id. § 5705.5 (West Supp. 1973); see note 64 supra.
N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 11.03(10) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
75. CAL. WEL. & INST. CODE § 5750 (West 1972).
76. Id. § 5651(h).
77. Id. §§ 5656-61.
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of the Act is primarily the result of the willingness and beliefs of a
group of legislators to act as a watchdog over the Department of
Health. These individuals are prepared to develop statutory details
which would be considered in New York to be within the jurisdiction
of department policy.7 8 The sections discussed were chosen because of
their contrast or similarity to the New York provisions. They are set
forth in a comparative fashion in order to provide the background for
an analysis of the results of the New York legislation.
IV. NEw YORK LUSA AND CALIFORNIA S-DA: A COMPARISON

The following section of the Comment will focus on three aspects
of the New York unified services approach which have resulted in practical problems: the role of the state hospital, administrative concerns
and financial issues.
A. The Role of the State Hospital
The California legislature, unlike the New York legislature, made
it clear from the beginning that it intended to close the state hospitals.
The origins of the decision can be traced to the state's desire, as expressed by the Governor, to get out of the costly state hospital business. In addition, the California counties already had a long history of
involvement in public health planning.7
Early in 1973 the State Department of Health revealed details of
what it terms "a plan for a plan", in which it outlined the continued
reduction in population and eventual closure of all state hospitals for
mentally ill and mentally retarded persons. All hospitals serving the
needs of mentally ill persons were expected to be closed by mid-1977,
and the hospitals for the retarded were expected to be closed by
1982.0

At the same time, the operation of the Lanterman-Petris-Short
Act caused a decrease in the number of state hospital admissions and
the population of the hospitals dropped from 34,955 in 1963 to 7,264
78. B. Barkovich, supra note 62, at 2.
79. See id. at 23.
80. CAL. SENATE SELECT COMI. ON PROPOSED PHASE-OUT OF STATE HOSPITAL
SERVICES, PRELIMINARY REPORT 2 (1973) [hereinafter cited as PRELIMINARY REPORT].
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in March, 1973.81 The overall trend toward treatment of patients in
the community was encouraged because the law provided that additional funds would be freed for community use by reducing inpatient
care.8 Hospital discharges were also encouraged because the fixed costs
of running a hospital remained and cost per patient rose.
In some, if not all, cases the counties and their residents were not
ready to provide treatment for the patients discharged under these
conditions. Numerous charges and countercharges were pressed by
both the proponents and opponents of the state hospital system. The
California State Employees Association (CSEA) alleged that patients
were being shoved into the community and left stranded with no one
83
to supervise them.
According to CSEA, the principal result of the new laws has been to
take "thousands of mentally ill patients out of state hospitals and
scatter them among 58 different counties," allowing "many . . .
patients to end up in transient hotels or small board-and-care homes
in rundown neighborhoods where they receive no treatment," and
permitting the cost of mental health care to "skyrocket."8' 4
Los Angeles County recently surveyed 874 board-and-care facilities which serve more than 11,000 residents and found that many of
these homes provide nothing more than custody. "There is lots we can
do before we can say that board-and-care is an adequate substitute for
an institution," commented the county's Deputy of Mental Health,
Dr. Areta Cromwell.8 5
The advocates of the community approach said that, at worst,
conditions in the community care homes were about the same as conditions in the state hospitals and that in most instances the community
81. Id. at 1. Sacramento County is one example of a county with a diminishing
admission rate:
Year
Admissions
1967-68
853
1968-69
1058
1969-70
409
1970-71
271
1971-72
138
Fourkas, One County's Experience with Mental Health Reform, 1972 CALIF. J. 255.
82. CAL. WEL. & INST. CODE § 5663 (West 1972).
83. Bradley, supra note 63, at 182.

84. Id. at 185.
85. Fourkas, supra note 81, at 257.
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residences were far better.8 6 A study in one county supported the contention of the adequacy of the community programs. The principal
finding was that
persons released from the state hospitals on or after July 1, 1969,
and returned to Butte County have made adequate community adjustment. .

.

. The social, financial, and mental health needs of the

87
individuals are being adequately met by community agencies.

Because of the lack of clear proof for these claims, the California
Senate convened a Select Committee to investigate the results of closing the state hospitals. 8 Their preliminary report indicates that the
emphasis in the community programs on outpatient care resulted in
a lack of inpatient treatment facilities for discharged state hospital patients who needed such care on a short-term basis. 89 The Committee
also noted that there was considerable duplication of service by state
and county agencies, and that the follow-up on patients to be certain
that their social, psychological and residential needs were being met
was inadequate. 90 The Committee found serious problems of coordination of state and local services. The lack of coordination resulted in
"linkage and slippage" problems. That is, the agencies were not set up
to see that persons needing service could move appropriately through
the system, and as a result the clients were lost in the process. 9 1 The coordination problem also resulted in differences in the standard for
2
housing, licensing and staffing set by the state and county agencies.
As noted above, the original plan for closing the state hospitals
used as an incentive for the development of community programs a
promise to return saved state funds to the communities. A study by
the Assembly Ways and Means Subcommittee on Mental Health Services found that the promised shift in funds from the state to the
county for reducing the number of patient days was not taking place.
There was a great deal of county dissatisfaction as a result of the failure on the state's part.93 The state simply claimed that the shift could
86. Bradley, supra note 63, at 184.
87. Id. at 185. The investigator further indicated that the finding leads to the
question whether the individuals actually needed a hospital setting before or after July,
1969. Id.
88. Cal. S. Res. 20 (1973).
89. PRELIMINARY REPORT 9.
90. Id. at 9-10.
91. Id. at 11-12.
92. Id. at 13.
93. Id. at 14-15.
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never have fully taken place because of the fixed costs. 9 4 A compromise

solution to this problem was reached when the legislature promised
additional programming funds from the state general fund rather than
from the savings of the state hospital system. 95
Thus, while the initial goal of the California system was to close
the state hospitals, it was found that such a goal was overly simplistic.
In the face of raging political storms and increasing violent crime,
the Reagan administration, in at least a partial reversal of its earlier
positions, now plans to keep in operation
for the "foreseeable future"
96
the 11 state institutions still in existence.

It is generally agreed that custodial institutional care of patients
should be ended, but it has also been recognized that such care is not
synonymous with state hospitals. For example, one psychiatrist noted
that many of the community treatment homes were no more than "a
series of poorly staffed, poorly equipped, miniature mental hospitals."9 7
State hospitals then have a legitimate role to play in the transition to
the community. The Director of Health noted:
The plan that the leadership of the Department of Health has long
advocated and towards which we seem to be gradually moving in an
orderly fashion is the retention of state hospitals in both northern and
southern California very nearly as presently constituted. There were
not and are not plans to close any of these hospitals though this
does not mean the state department
would be unresponsive to
98
changing patterns of utilization.

Therefore, while a slogan such as "community treatment means closing down the state hospitals" has a theoretical appeal, achievement of
this avowed objective seems impossible. In fact, in California the hospitals are still being used and serve as back up facilities to treat the
most difficult patients or those whose treatment last a long period of
time.99 The California experience indicates that attention should be
94. Bradley, supra note 63, at 184-85. In addition to the fixed costs, part of the
savings may have been diminished by inflation.
95. Id. at 185.
96. Ingram, Reagan Shelves Plan To Phase Out Mental Hospitals, Buffalo Courier
Express, Nov. 11, 1973, at 38, cols. 1-6.
97. Fourkas, supra note 81, at 257.
98. Address by J. M. Stubblebine, M.D., Director of Health, before the Cal. Sen.
Select Comm. on Proposed Phaseout of State Hospital Services, Oct. 9, 1973.
99. Id. at 2-3.
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given to defining the precise role of the state hospitals within the
system.
In New York the legislature's intentions regarding the future
of the state hospitals are ambiguous and are not set forth in LUSA.
The law could be read as meaning that since there is a clear emphasis
on community and county planning, state services must be phased out
and replaced by facilities operating closer to the population. However,
it may be significant that, with the California model clearly before it,
the New York legislature chose not to take a direct stand but to allow
the state hospital's role to be shaped by the particular community circumstances. The governor's budget message reflects this open-ended
approach:
The department is in a period of dramatic transition. State hospitals are shifting to a balanced system which uses hospitalization
selectively and places primary emphasis on linking state services to a
variety of community based programs. . . . To achieve the state's
ultimate goal of a fully integrated and more effective mental hygiene program a unified services system is proposed. 10 0
Whatever the rationale, the New York legislature took no direct

action to close the state hospitals. The decision about the role of the
state hospital falls de facto on the community or on the State Department of Mental Hygiene. If the communities are to make the decision, those communities in which state hospitals are a key segment
of the economy will have a difficult time moving away from the state
system. If the State Department of Mental Hygiene makes the decision about the hospital's role, the goal of community planning is severely eroded and the state gains additional power. With the increased
difficulty of securing an involuntary commitment' and the hoped-for
development of alternative voluntary community programs, there is a
serious question concerning the viability of these institutions.
In making the decision about the role that the state hospital will
play in the unified services system, consideration must be given to the

persons who are already hospitalized. Under a unified services program the county must treat all of its residents as well as assume 20
percent of the financial responsibility for its residents receiving mental health services in state institutions. This planning and fiscal duty
forces the state and county to deal with each other at least on paper
100. N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1973, at 18, col. 6.
101. N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW §§ 31.27-.31 (McKinney Supp. 1973).
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before funds are allocated under LUSA.10 2 The forced unification of
the system may circumvent the problem of "linkage" which developed
in the California system by making the parts of the system interdependent.
In New York, since the county has programming responsibility
for all patients there should be a limited problem with duplication of
services. The responsibility for aftercare of former inpatients should
be contracted to one agency or perhaps to the state hospital. Careful
planning is still necessary. When a person leaves the hospital where
a single institution has taken care of all his personal and medical needs
and enters the community, there may be no single agency which will
fill that all-encompassing role. A number of agencies may become
involved and the possibility of failure of communications and duplicate planning is present, especially because it is a new and untried
03
system.
LUSA excludes from the county's aggregate cost 04 the cost of
maintaining all patients who have been in a state hospital for more
than five years. It is not clear from the Act what will happen to these
patients. While they remain in the state hospital their care will be
funded entirely by the state. If it is to be assumed that these patients
will not leave the hospital, their dwindling number combined with
decreasing admissions and irreducible fixed expenses will increase the
per patient cost. It is not likely that such a situation can be fiscally
tolerated, but the alternative choice of centralizing the care for these
patients in one institution is also not very satisfying. If services for
the remaining patients are centralized, there will be problems with
determining the kind of psychological treatment which would be appropriate for each and with the morale of the personnel who would
be assigned to work with these "hopeless" cases. In excluding this
group of patients from the unified services plan, the legislature noted
that currently two out of three patients in state mental hospitals have
been there five years or longer. Although the return of such patients
102. It should be noted that the Act is only enabling legislation; the specific requirements of agency coordination will be contained in the Commissioner's regulations.
103. Erie County has initiated a plan to effect coordination of services by establishing public service not-for-profit mental health corporations in each of six catchment
(service) areas. These corporations are charged in the same way as the community
mental health centers with the responsibility for assuring the provision of a comprehensive range of services to defined populations.
104. N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 11.23(b) (1) (ii) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
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to the community should not be precluded, and indeed a unified
services plan should take their needs into consideration, it seems
inequitable to impose the expense of earlier inadequate treatment of
the mentally ill on the localities. 0 5
If these patients are eventually able to leave the hospital, the
question becomes whether they will enter the county system or whether
the state will maintain control over their follow-up. More problems
arise if the county of their original residence does not have a unified
services program. The question would then be whether the county
in which the hospital was located or the state would finance the nonresidents' care.
S-DA does not exclude long-term patients. In the hearing held by
the legislative subcommittee in New York the participants raised the
issue of their exclusion. Many felt that such a classification was tantamount to discrimination and might result in discouraging community
development of services for long-term patients. 106 The rationale for
this exclusion and the question of policy which it raises must be dealt
with by the Commissioner of Mental Hygiene's regulations.
Another group of patients who are not dealt with under LUSA
are those patients who are judged "dangerous," either on the basis of
their behavior or as a result of an alleged crime. In California, a
great deal of testimony before the Select Committee reflected the
problems of incorporating such dangerous patients into the community service system. The resulting compromise was explained by the
California Director of Health:
What I proposed then and I propose still is a total integrated system
of services for the mentally ill offender separate from the program
and facilities for the developmentally disabled and the mentally disabled. That system should have the full range of services from total
security facilities to outpatient clinics and everything between. It
should have a system of gradually moving patients back towards a
natural and normal life after they have demonstrated over an endurable period of time their ability to be non-violent, non-destructive
to themselves and others. . . . [S]uch a system network of services

should be under the control, auspices, and management of the Department of Health and that is still my present opinion.' 0 7
105. N.Y. SuBcomm. REPORT, supra note 24, at 5.
106. Id. at 9.
107. Address by J. M. Stubblebine, M.D., supra note 98.
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A full exploration of the issues which New York must decide in implementing a community-oriented treatment program for the "dangerous" patient is beyond the scope of this Comment. This treatment
question and the California resolution are presented in order to point
to an area of the law which needs further refinement.
The New York plan has an advantage in its financial system which
should also minimize the kind of funding problems California experienced. The funding of local programs is not contingent on the
reduction of the number of patient-days but rather depends on the
amount of service given throughout the system. The focus of county
planning will not be solely on reduction of hospitalization but will
be on maximizing the service received for each budgeted dollar.
It is not clear how the funding arrangements for the county's use
of the state hospitals as contract services will operate. Combined with
the issue of funding is the issue of control over programming and
staffing. While it might be assumed that under the unified services
plan the county and the state would maintain control over their own
staff, LUSA provides that:
The local governmental unit shall have full powers necessary for administration and the execution of its duties to appoint and employ,
with power of removal, full and part time officers, employees and
consultants, including employees of the department in accordance
with the standards, policies,
and salary schedules provided by law
108
or otherwise authorized.
If the section is read as granting the county full power of state staff,
the financial relationship between the two seems further confused. A
literal reading of the section gives the county not only programming
priority over the state but also a certain amount of financial control.
The New York LUSA is ambiguous about the role of the state
hospitals. The California experience seems to indicate that the complete dismantling of the state hospital system is not advantageous. The
unanswered question in New York centers on the part state hospitals
can play in a unified program. Since the legislature has given no indication of the approach to be taken, the ultimate role of the state hospital may vary throughout the state unless the Department of Mental
Hygiene takes a firm position and delineates the kinds of services
108. N.Y.
added).
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which the state hospital should offer. However, the lack of specificity
in the law leaves open to consideration some very important issues,
including the treatment of the persons presently in hospitals, the treatment of "dangerous" patients and the precise financial arrangement
between the state and the county. The effort to coordinate the two
systems by giving primary responsibility to the county for persons
receiving treatment may overcome some of the major problems which
the California approach has raised. 10 9
B. Administrative Concerns
In California, the responsibility for mental health programming
for all facilities except the state hospitals rests in the county government. State control is also limited; all policy decisions on rules and
regulations must be approved by the California Conference of Local
Mental Health Directors as well as by state officials." 0 To facilitate
state and county communication, the state department has also created
the position of Community Program Analyst. The Community Program Analyst performs the dual role of advising the counties on how
to develop programs tailored to their needs and reviewing the plan
to be sure that it will meet with state approval. This administrative
arrangement allows for considerable local input and control and close
community liaison with the state department."'
In New York, the review is made by the Commissioner of the Department of Mental Hygiene on the basis of the county's compliance
with the law and the cost-effectiveness of the plan. The commissioner
has the power to set the original standards and regulations. There is
no body analogous to the Conference to assure top level community
input. In fact, in New York one can seriously question whether control of the programs has actually shifted. One commentator has noted
that
[t]he community mental health movement is hardly revolutionary.
What it
to those
transfer
munities

has really offered is an extension of mental health services
who had previously been denied them, without any clear
of control over the provision of those services to the com2
involved."1

109. See text accompanying note 76 supra.
110. CAL. WEL. & INST. CODE § 5750 (West 1972).
111. B. Barkovich, supra note-62, at 11-12.
112. Wellington & Tischer, Community Mental Health: Why the Benign Neglect?
3 YALE REV. OF L. & Soc. ACTION 78, 80 (1972).
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The California and New York laws present two different approaches to state-local conflict resolution. In California, if the Conference of Local Mental Health Directors refuses or fails to approve the
standards, rules or regulations submitted to it by the department, the
department may resubmit them. If the Conference again refuses, a
decisionmaking committee composed of the Secretary of the Human
Relations Agency, the Director of Mental Hygiene, the President of
the Conference, the Chairman of the Citizens Advisory Council and
a member of the State Health Planning Committee makes the final
disposition of the matter.113
In contrast to the elaborate provision of the California Act which
ultimately includes all interested parties, the New York provision
grants all authority to the commissioner in the case of a disagreement
between state and local service providers." 4 In addition, if the local
governmental unit refuses to contract with a private agency, that
agency may appeal to the commissioner. If the appeal is upheld, the
state department may enter into a contract, completely bypassing the
community unified services plan." 5
If these procedures are combined with the fact that the state-local
partnership in unified services is 80:20, the potential lack of equality is
more striking. The new law seems to result in an administrative
anomaly. While the legislature describes the law using terms such as
"local responsibility" 1 6 the county may not be gaining any power.
Under the CMHSA, the county shared one-half the financial obligation
for its agencies and in many cases the state doled out financial aid
while retaining no planning power. Now the county has financial
control over only 20 percent of those agencies and the state has a clear
planning mandate. In counties where there were few agencies under
CMHSA, this means more power and service for the county than before. But in areas where counties had an ongoing relationship with
the service providing agencies, LUSA introduces a third partner and
the potential for increased administrative problems.
A second problem in the administration of LUSA is the division
of powers, duties and responsibilities within the local governmental
unit. In non-charter governments, the executive power is granted to
113. CAL. WEL. & INST. CODE § 5750 (West 1972).
114. N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 11.19(a)(1)
115. Id. § 11.13(e).
116. See text accompanying note 126 infra.
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the board. Serious questions may be raised as to capability of a board
of community representatives to administer such a complex program.
In addition, some counties already have Departments of Mental
Health, usually headed by psychiatrists, which are involved in direct
service and in coordinating already existing programs. 1 7 There is a
need for further clarification of the role of such departments, especially in relation to the community board. It would seem that such
issues should be left to the discretion of the local community based
on its needs and governmental structure. LUSA designation of the
board as the responsible unit seems to be an unnecessary usurpation
of the local prerogative.
An important aspect of the administration of a community-based
program will be the determination of the population to be served.
In California, the plan was developed to serve all persons in need of
help. However, the major beneficiaries have been the poor. The fee
structure in the S-DA system has been based on the payment of actual
cost of service by the state, up to a predetermined liability limited
by an individual's income, assets and debt. As a result, at least for
short-term care, a middle- or upper-class client pays the full cost of
service, which is often comparable to the cost of service in the private
sector. The two major reasons for this fee structure were the desires
to keep state costs down and to protect the private sector from government-supported competition."" The New York law requires that a
fee schedule be set up in order to receive reimbursement for services.
A close examination of the results in California suggests that careful
consideration should be given to the rates so that the plan will result
in the widest possible coverage. This caveat is important to the philosophy of LUSA, which has the goal of providing mental health
services based on need and not on the wealth of the county of residence.
A second issue with respect to administrative difficulties is the
determination of the type of patient who will use the program. Until
recently community clinics dealt primarily with short-term psychotic
patients as well as those with neurotic symptoms. 11 If the systems are
unified there will be an influx of patients from the state hospital
117. E.g., Chautauqua and Cattaraugus Counties have Departments of Mental
Health which combine administrative and service duties.
118. See generally B. Barkovich, supra note 62, at 36-37.
119. G. FAIRWEATHER, D. SANDERS, D. CRESSLER & H. MAYNARD, COMMUNITY
LIFE FOR THE MENTALLY ILL

12 (1969).
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whose institutionalized behavior will make additional demands on
the community system. This may require a reorientation of the staff
and the programmed activities of the existing community clinics in
order to provide useful services to the chronic patients from the state
hospitals.
Both LUSA and S-DA require evaluation as an important part
of their programs. Evaluation is essential to the administration of any
good program. The evaluative scheme set forth in LUSA lacks specificity concerning the type, depth and goals of evaluation. Without
adequate review of the programs, the communities may lose their control and influence over the agencies. Measures of effectiveness are traditionally hard to develop in the mental health field because professional opinions differ on the nature of successful treatment.
Traditionally, those who provide social services oppose efforts to
measure effectiveness, saying that the types of changes that result, for
example, from the treatment of the mentally ill are extremely difficult to isolate and quantify in any useful way. As a consequence,
most policy decisions in the past have been made on the basis of the
number of patients to be served, costs of care and boarding, and
various staffing standards. Very little information has been generated
as to the relative merits of one program or form20 of treatment as
compared with another on a cost-effectiveness basis.'
The problem with the traditional systems of evaluation is that they

overlook a number of important factors. For example, if cost-effectiveness is established as the criterion and it is to be measured by the number of patients served, certain services will be given continually low
priority due to their lack of client contact. Some services are highly
visible and have clear constituencies, for example, crisis intervention;
others are extremely difficult to -see and measure, for example, -education and prevention. Under the standard of cost-effectiveness, such
indirect services may be continually decreased.
Another effect of such a ranking system is that individualized
programs may be overlooked in an attempt to set state-wide measures.
The law provides that in New York, allocation will be made on the
basis of evaluation studies sponsored by the State Department of Mental Hygiene.' 21 The state-wide approach can seriously encroach on
local prerogatives. For example, in 1970, while still operating under
120. Bradley, supra note 63, at 185.
121. N.Y.
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the CMHSA, the community boards were told by the Division of
Local Assistance that they would not be refunded unless their programs included drug treatment. Some representatives did not feel that
drug abuse was a high priority problem in their area and they did
not know how to go about developing such services. Thus the commissioner wields effective power over local programs by maintaining the
22
ability to withhold state aid.
Reliance on state-wide standards for overall planning may be
disastrous in that it may ignore individual differences and become a
game of statistics. In New York, the diversity of county sizes and programming needs is marked and state-wide evaluation could be especially invidious. The California program has just initiated an extensive evaluation study in five representative counties.2 The results of
this study may be particularly useful in developing the New York
regulations.
The most serious concern for the administrators of unified services
will be allocation of power between state and local governments.
While it may be expected that the commissioner's regulations will set
out the organizational chart, the fact that the decision is contingent
on the state's initiative is indicative of the state's superior position in
the structure. At the same time, the Act's suggested hierarchy raises
the question of the ability of the counties to develop their own programs from the beginning. The present limited contribution of a
number of the counties to local mental health programs and their
reluctance to participate in CMHSA raises serious doubts about the
capacity of a county with limited financial and personnel resources
to become a full partner in a unified services plan.2 4 The S-DA sys122. M. Harding, supra note 6, at 6.
123. Bradley, supra note 63, at 185-86.
To aid in designing an effective evaluation system, the Department of Mental
Hygiene set up eight task forces . . . to determine independently how to build
such a system. Representatives of these task forces were then brought together
to "synthesize" the results of their separate efforts. Several task forces recommended "peer review" through the use of professional review panels. A second
suggestion was to allow agencies to set their own goals (for example, reduction
of depression), then to measure their achievement. A third suggestion was
to select a number of basic societal goals (e.g. reduction of dangerous behavior), for which all programs would be responsible. The final product
blends all three of these elements in a way which department officials hope
will please program administrators, clinicians, and state and local decision
makers alike.

Id.
124. See notes 24-26 supra & accompanying text.
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tem allows wide latitude to the counties to progress at their own
pace. The role of the state department became primarily that of advisor and coordinator.
LUSA may choose the county-centered option or it may continue
the dominant role of the state. The state could maintain a central
position by enacting regulations which grant a great deal of power to
the State Department of Local Services rather than the Department of
Mental Health (which presently controls the state hospitals).
C. FinancialIssues
1. The funding ratio. The state-local ratio in the California system
was based on the total 1968-69 budget. The state funds represented
93 percent of the total allocation; the local governments contributed
7 percent. These figures were rounded and the county was reimbursed
$90 for every $100 spent on services. 2 5 The state retained sufficient
funds to care for state hospital patients. As noted above, the simple
90:10 ratio did not operate as an adequate incentive because the theoretical per patient savings resulting from discharging patients did not
go to the counties.
The New York plan introduces a new element in its formulaper capita population credits. The population credit has the effect of
giving a substantial amount of initial funds to all counties to begin
programming even if the tax base of the county is limited. In fact, it
will provide 100 percent funding if the county mental health budget
is less than $10 per capita for the first 100,000 and $5 per capita for
the rest of the population.
By basing the maximum on a per capita basis rather than a property basis, the state allows--all- citizens to participate initially on an
equal basis. Counties who wish to provide more services continue to
receive state aid but on a reduced basis. The New York legislature's
Subcommittee on Mental Hygiene has stated its support for this twolevel state aid formula which may have the effect of encouraging participation by less sophisticated counties while placing a limit on the
size of the program to be supported at the liberal rate. Thus local ef1 6
fort is supported and local responsibility is encouraged. 2
125. B. Barkovich, supranote 62, at 27.
126. N.Y. Sunco&i?.

RmPORT 12. See also Bradley, supra note 63, at 185. Some

of the problems of the present funding system in California might be alleviated by an
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2. Mandatory v. optional plans. S-DA required all counties with
over 100,000 population to join the plan. Initially the counties were
slow to join. In the first year of the program, $786,000 was appropriated by the legislature, but of the six counties qualifying with two
or more reimbursable services, only $37,000 of the allocation was
claimed.127 By 1973, all 58 counties had joined the S-DA system. 128

It should be noted that the less populated counties have had
many problems managing their programs and attracting sufficient staff
to provide services. In California, the smaller counties' resource problems were exacerbated by the fact that the amount of the program
budget was limited to the assessed property value. There are some advantages for the small counties when they join the program:
1) Before passage of the Lanterman-Petris-Short and Short-Doyle
Acts, a county sent $5 per month per patient to a state hospital that
treated its patients. This was money that was lost to the county.
Short-Doyle counties do not have to make this payment.
2) Both the state's 90% and the county's 10% go back into the
county (for jobs, plant, etc.) rather than out to the state hospital.
3) A general commitment to local care had developed that was quite
strong in California by the mid 1960's."'
A number of factors have contributed to the limited success of S-DA
programs in the smaller counties, including a shortage of funds due
to their generally conservative administrative policies, a lack of private
agencies to give service and the difficulty of maintaining the confidentiality of the client.130

LUSA contains no requirement that the counties join the program, but it makes the local services option financially less attractive,
adaptation of the New York approach. In fact, the issue of per capita financing was
discussed during the 1970 hearings of the California Assembly Ways and Means Subcommittee. The concept is being tried in California on a limited basis.
The counties that had been late to enter the Short-Doyle program argued
that per-capita funding would help to assure them their "fair share" of the
mental health dollar. However, counties that had entered the program at the
start said that such a system would penalize them for having done so. These
differences obviously made it very difficult to shift entirely to per-capita
financing.

Id.

127. DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HYGIENE,
FORNIA MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES 1 (1973).
128. B. Barkovich, supra note 62, at 1.
129. Id. at 27.

130. Id. at 34.
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because of its decreasing rate of reimbursement.' 3 ' New York does not
limit the budgetary maximum for mental health services to the
county's property values, but according to the Department's statistics,
a number of the smaller counties will have to pay more than they are
currently allocating in order to join the unified services option. With
the choice of decreasing reimbursement or increasing expenditure,
what real incentive is there for the smaller counties to participate?
If the plan is not mandatory and the counties have to expend more
energy and money to implement it, it is likely that a number of the
counties may not join or may delay joining the system until unification
is proved to be a success. Perhaps in recognition of this potential
situation, a number of the existing agencies indicated their support
for a mandatory requirement in the hearings before the New York
legislative Subcommittee. 132 The legislature seemed unwilling to take
a stand on the issue.
An optional system such as the 1954 Community Mental Health
Services Act has proven slow and cumbersome in getting all counties to undertake effective programs of care. The; Subcommittee
deems it essential that localities not continue situations where services
to the mentally ill and retarded have low priority in local interest
and resources. The Subcommittee feels that if the more progressive
and interested localities undertake unified services while those with
less citizen support and fiscal resources maintain the status quo, there
is a danger of two levels of care resulting-contradictory to universally accepted goals. However, how unified services will best be instituted throughout the State, remains to be worked out in consultation with 3 the Governor's Office and the Department of Mental
1
Hygiene.

As a result of the legislature's recognition of the problems of a mandatory statute, the issue was left to the discretion of the executive, and
the bill passed with a completely optional provision. If a substantial
number of counties do not join, another dual system of programming and financing will result with the administrative drawbacks
of the present dual system.
131. Farber, Governor Offers Mental Aid Plan, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1973, at 53,
col. 5; see Memorandum by Nelson Rockefeller, Governor of New York, June 11, 1973,
in [1973] Laws of New York 2347.
132. N.Y. SuBcosms.

133. Id. at 10-11.
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3. The cost of the program. Mental health has traditionally been
supported by public funding.134 When the components of the total
cost to the taxpayer are analyzed, it becomes difficult to make an
accurate determination of the cost of any one part as compared to
another. For example,
[i]t is not possible to compare the cost of a community mental health
program to the cost of operating a state hospital because the two
systems are not treating the same set of patients. Not only are a
greater number of patients being treated through community programs, but also these patients' needs often differ greatly from the
needs of those patients who were or are receiving treatment in a
state hospital. A great number of patients being treated in a community would never have been considered candidates for state hospital treatment, either because their illness was not serious enough
to warrant 24-hour care, or because they were considered "acute"
cases, in need of short-term, intensive treatment. 35
Besides looking at the type of service being offered, one must also
consider the direct and indirect costs of providing such service in determining the costs of a mental health program. 130 It must be further
realized that costs cannot be simply eliminated without careful examination of the needs which the expenditure is fulfilling. One economist who undertook a comprehensive study in 1954 noted:
The nation bears the cost of mental illness whether it finances the
direct costs or not. Economic considerations do not necessarily concern themselves with human or ethical values, but it is possible that
increases in direct costs may reduce total costs. Measures reducing
indirect costs are welcome, even though they may add to the direct
costs.

137

Thus, the cost of mental health services must be viewed as a
closed system; a change or a shift in one part may not result in an
134. Atwell, The Financing of Mental Health Services, in PERSPECTIVES IN COMr136-37 (A. Bindman & A. Spiegel eds. 1972).
135. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 80, at 13.
136. R. FEIN, ECONOmIS O MENTAL ILLNESS X (1958).
Direct costs are actual expenditures for the care of the mentally ill by public
and private agencies, by patients or by their families, and by public institutions
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and private foundations interested in mental health. Indirect costs are calcu-

lated on the basis of the annual loss of production, of annual earnings and of
work years by patients who are hospitalized and could not be presumed to
be, if they were not hospitalized, self-employed.
Id.
137. Id. at xiii.
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elimination of that part but' merely in more pressure being applied
to other parts of the system., For example, the California attempt to
cut costs by closing the state hospitals demonstrated that such unilateral cuts without careful planning and phasing-in can wreak havoc
with the system. It resulted in great human and political cost because
the need represented by the expenditure was not and perhaps could
not be eliminated.
An examination of the estimated costs to the counties of LUSA
shows that all but 14 counties will save money on the new plan.13
However, those figures are based on the assumption that the use of
the system will remain the same and that the plan will not necessitate higher administrative allocations which would create new financial pressures.
The California experience has shown that under S-DA the use
of services has increased. The increase was related to the convenience
of the services and greater community acceptance of outpatient care.
As a result of these factors, the California mental health budget has
doubled since 1968.139 In addition, once an inpatient is discharged
from the mental health system his housing and food are no longer
funded by the Department of Mental Hygiene budget. However, his
needs will still have to be met by state support unless the person is
able to get substantial employment. The increased costs of welfare,
rehabilitation programs and the construction of housing facilities will
have to be supplied by increased budgets in other state departments.
It may also be hypothesized that the increased complexity of planning
140
and coordination will increase administrative costs.

If the state facilities are used with less frequency, thus causing a
decrease in the facilities' staff, and if those staff members cannot be retrained for county programs, the unemployment of these former personnel must be considered as a cost of the program. If state and county
employees are combined in programs, a problem concerning parity of
salary and benefits may arise which has the potential for upsetting
138. N.Y. SUBCOBIM. REPORT Table II.
139. B. Barkovich, supra note 62, at 27.
140. The Coalition of Voluntary Agencies has noted that a unified service system will demand that increased amounts of information be available to all agencies in
order to provide continuity. Such an information system has been experimented with
on a limited basis and the result is not only increashd time allocation and paperwork
but also a severe limitation on-patient -privacy and confidentiality. Coalition of Voluntary Agencies, Position Paper 8 (1973) (on file at Buffalo Law Review office, State
University of New York at Buffalo, Faculty of Law and Jurisprudence, BuffalosN.Y.).
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the effectiveness of a program. In addition to the personnel costs, the
cost of unused, existing facilities must be considered.
Although much of the state level publicity supporting the passage
of the law focused on the savings to the counties, the reality of the
savings is questionable. 141 Educated estimates show that the additional
cost for the first year will be $3.4 million. Any extra county expenditures must be covered by the state which clearly means more expense
at the state level. For example, in Sacramento County, California, the
county's cost over three years has remained between $525,000 and
$600,000 but the state's contribution to the county's mental health
budgeb has risen from $1.9 million in 1968-69 to $4.4 million in
1971-72.14 The question then becomes whether there is an ultimate
saving to the taxpayer or whether the state figures merely represent a
shift of part of the financial burden from the community to state
level.
While all of these costs must be considered in evaluating the total
cost of the new plan, the fiscal aspects must be put into perspective
and weighed with the total human costs of not using the system. LUSA
provides financial incentives in order to encourage the counties to
establish a broad-based mental health service designed to meet the
specific needs of their residents. An increase in service will necessitate an increase in cost. The relevant inquiry is whether such an increase in expenditures will result in better, more effective treatment.
V.

EVALUATION AND CONCLUSIONS

The most important questions that can be asked of any legislation
are-will it work or can it make a difference? LUSA embodies a policy decision which may affect a number of interest groups in different
ways. The effectiveness of this law will depend on whether these interest groups support or encourage the implementation of the Act. In
an analysis of the impact of mental health legislation in California one
author noted:
Obtaining consensus from a set of sufficiently weighty interests to win
a major policy victory is the [social legislator's] basic objective. The
interests that endorse a proposal do so for their own reasons, which
141. N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1973, at 95, col. 1.
142. Fourkas, supra note 81, at 258.
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may not be shared by any other interests. By consensus therefore, I
do not mean anything like "harmony" or a "meeting of the minds."
I mean only that there is independent assent to the same proposal.
By far the most important obstacle to this objective is the tendency
for major policy changes to disrupt a complex ecology of organizational programs and individual practice and, consequently, to displease some interests in the long run and great many others in the
1 48
long run, that is, during the transitional period.
Section IV discussed some of the provisions of the law which could
upset the balance of the present system. This section will examine the
specific advantages and disadvantages of the law for several interest

groups in order to assess the prospects for attaining the "independent
assent" necessary to make the law effective.
A. The County's Interest
As the Act is presently structured, the county's position is ambiguous. While the county, working through the local governmental
unit, seems to have ultimate control over the provision of services and
the treatment of patients, the state has maintained fiscal control by
its power over final approval of the county's unified services plan. The
threat of withdrawal of funds is a potent weapon, especially once programs are initiated and become dependent on the funds. Under the
Act the county gains responsibility and control over the patients in
the state hospital who are presently in the state's jurisdiction, but the
county's share of the costs, and thus its fiscal independence, has been
decreased from 50 percent to 20 percent.
The CMHSA state aid formula puts minimum restrictions on the
funds allocated to the community. The money is channelled through
the Division of Local Services which has a number of regional offices
throughout the state. The Division works closely with the counties
providing advice on their programs. Under the present system the
counties have considerable flexibility and their programs may be handcrafted to meet local needs. The difference in population and sophistication of the counties throughout the state make such flexibility
in planning critical to the adequate provision of services. Under LUSA
as it stands, the regulations which will be issued by the Commissioner
143. E. BADACH, supra note 2, at 183 (emphasis added).
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of Mental Hygiene will be extremely important. They will indicate
the amount of local responsibility which the state is willing to surrender. The regulations should set forth very specific criteria for approval, requiring the counties to provide proper accounting systems,
personnel standards, hiring procedures and evaluation systems. The
regulations should describe the minimum requirements necessary to
provide a state-wide quality control. They must, however, allow for
a great deal of county creativity and flexibility. LUSA does list a large
number of potential services available to counties in creating their
programs, and the regulations should continue to permit local officials
to decide on program content.
In developing the regulations, it may be helpful to distinguish
the policy-making functions from the funding function. If the goal
of the unified services system is to provide a spectrum of health care
in which persons needing help can be easily referred to the most appropriate agency as their needs change, it is essential that policies
throughout the system be uniform. Uniformity is generally promoted
by centralized decisionmaking. One group should have overall responsibility for assessing the needs, developing the services, establishing admission and termination criteria, providing follow-up and evaluating the quality of services provided. A county should have this
144
authority if it is prepared to assume it;
the state should retain the
funding function.
A critical factor in allocating primary power to the counties is
their ability to administer such a plan. In California one of the results of unprepared counties assuming administrative responsibility
was that they abdicated their power to private agencies. Thus agencies have sometimes assumed control without adequate provisions for
accountability and evaluation of service to the county. 145
144. This organizational structure and function was possible under CMHSA. In
Erie County, implementation of this model had begun prior to LUSA. In fact, as Dr.
James Warde, Commissioner of Department of Mental Health for Erie County, points
out, the 1954 Act was in some respects stronger than LUSA in that the powers, duties
and responsibilities of local government were more specific and clearly defined. He noted
the change from the term "local mental health authority" to "local governmental unit"
and the word "shall" used throughout the provisions of CMHSA is replaced by the
"may" in LUSA. With the requirement under LUSA for the "concurrence of the directors of department facilities serving the area and the local governmental unit" there is
some diffusion of decisionmaking power but it also furnishes an administrative mechanism to permit integration and refocusing of all resources against defined population
needs.
145. B. Barkovich, supra note 62, at 39.
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The New York law mandates a broader spectrum of services for
each responsible county. These services include mental health, mental
retardation and alcoholism. In California the requirements for service
are more limited. For example, the mental retardation services are
separate and the state provides a special-fund allocation for any target group which needs particular services. In New York, the agencies
providing health services indicated their support of broad county
service requirements at the legislative hearings.146 However, the prospects seem remote for the less populous counties meeting such requirements.
Unless special state-wide assistance is given to help the counties
in the evaluative process, it is doubtful that they will be able to provide objective, systematic evaluation due to their limited number of
staff members. Small counties have had difficulty attracting good administrators and well-trained professional staff. Even if a competent
staff were available, much of its time would necessarily be devoted
to providing direct service and not to the task of evaluation.
Small counties may also object to the unified services plan because
of the influx of funds which will flow directly to New York City. While
all state taxpayers will share the expected increased cost of the program ($16.5 million over five years), it is estimated that during that
same period New York City will save $10.2 million.14 7
The redistribution of funds at the county level may introduce a
political element into the mental health system. If decisions are made
at a local level, the persons making the decisions on priorities have
little insulation from unreasoned political attacks. In analyzing this
element in S-DA one author stated:
Although the Short-Doyle Act was afflicted by internal problems of
interprofessional competition, personal rivalries and administrative
confusion, it probably had no more than the normal quota of troubles
one would find in most complex organizations. It experienced its unusually hard problems with the community, particularly in those areas
where the radicial right, or what is called the anti-mental-health
movement, was strong. Usually, these problems would be most severe

in the early years of the program's existence. Once the program was
established and the county supervisors had continued its budgetary
support for a few years, the opposition admitted defeat and left it
148
alone.
146. N.Y. SUBCOMm. REPORT 9-10.
147. Id. at Table III.
148. E. BARDAcH, supra note 2, at 83-84.
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However, even if the opposition eventually subsides, it is difficult to
initiate a program under such conditions. A director of a New York
state hospital suggests that
[t]ying complex fiscal, arrangements to the concept of unified services seems unnecessary and untimely. Introducing unessential economic incentives could lead to further struggle for control and power
by state and local institutions, and by the many county governments.
The State Department of Mental Hygiene enjoys the reputation of
being relatively apolitical. In tying mental health services so closely
to the finances of county government there is a danger of politicizing
the system as has tended to be the case with schools and welfare.
The law of parsimony applies here. I would split the program
concept and the financing. Much can be done by administrative
means and, if necessary, by legislation in regard to the program
concepts. Then
with experience additional needs can be better de149
determined.
In summary, LUSA has laid the groundwork for a system of
community-based mental health service units. But the law itself does
not sufficiently assure that such a system will evolve. In the long run,
counties must be aggressive and fully utilize their programming potential under the law if they are to establish adequate communitybased health services for their residents. If they establish comprehensive programs with broad community support, the state should not be
able to interfere. It is difficult to predict the impact on, counties
which do not have the administrative ability, the financial resources
or the trained staff to implement adequate plans. In those counties
which adopt a unified services plan the costs will increase-the effect in
the long run of higher administrative expenses and increased patient
contact. If they do not join the plan, the diminishing reimbursements
from the state will cause an increase in the cost of existing service
and/or a decrease in service.
An attempt to assess the cost-benefit for the counties varies from
county to county. Each county has the potential for a broad-based program tailored to its needs. In the final analysis unified services will
prove more expensive, but the costs will be offset by citizen benefit.
Many counties were already providing local input'5 0 and for these
149. Mesnikoff, Unified Services Promising Successor to Mental Health Centers, 15
N.Y. STATE DIST. BRANCH OF THE Am. PSYcHIATRIc ASs'N 8 (1973).
150. See notes 24 & 25 supra.
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counties the law may merely legitimize the choices they have already
made. By passing a law to implement this program rather than using
an administrative mandate, the legislature has created a structure
which is state-wide in application. The cost of legislative simplicity
may be a decrease in administrative flexibility for the counties as they
adopt the plan. This liability may, however, be overcome by county
input into the Commissioner's regulations.
B. The State Interest
One interest the state has in LUSA is the development of a role
for the state hospital. Prior to LUSA, the population in state hospitals
had been decreasing due to more restrictive admissions policies and
an increase in community alternatives under CMHSA. The state hospitals had begun some outpatient care and the length of patient stays
had decreased. If a county enters into the unified Services plan and
assumes treatment responsibility for its residents in the state hospital,
the state's control is diminished. At the same time, however, the director of the state facility will become a part of the community planning team with the power to approve or disapprove of the pro151
gram.
Personnel problems will arise at both the county and state levels
when the systems merge. In many areas the salaries, fringe benefits,
hours, job descriptions, and career opportunities afforded by county
and state facilities are disparate. Considerable morale problems may
be anticipated when employees doing the same work receive different
rewards. If the program tries to move ahead without first settling these
issues, the repercussions of discontent are likely to permeate the system and considerably limit the success of the program.
The decreasing use of the state hospitals may cause an additional
concern for the state in terms of retraining its former employees. These
employees have primarily been responsible for providing custodial
inpatient care. The decreasing demand for these services accompanied
by an increase in demand for counseling skills in a community setting
may create an unemployment problem similar to the one which resulted from the closing of some California institutions. The State De151. N.Y.
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§ 11.19(d) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
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partment of Mental Hygiene should consider retraining programs in
order to facilitate the transition into the community.
Another reason for promoting the unified services plan is to avoid
the dual system of financing that existed on the state level. Under the
present system, funds for the state hospital are channelled through the
Division of Mental Health whereas funds for community service come
through the Division of Local Services. LUSA attempts to eliminate
this dual system by decreasing the reimbursements to counties with a
local services plan, thus creating a financial incentive for those counties to join the unified services plan. This "forced-choice" approach to
funding may result in two undesirable effects. First, counties may enter the program purely because of the economics of it and then provide only minimal services. Secondly, they may not enter the program
and therefore will have to either increase local taxes or decrease
service to maintain their present level of care. If the communities
choose the latter option, the state will again have a dual financing
system. Even if all the counties eventually establish a unified program,
the state will have to maintain a dual system for a period of time.
One may question whether a single system of funding is possible
or even desirable where there is such diversity throughout the state.
As was noted above, there is a variety in the type and scope of existing programs due in large part to the difference in county population and needs. Second, there exists a wide range of services which are
part of a complete mental health system including inpatient care, residential treatment, day care, outpatient services and specialized services for target groups such as children, adolescents, geriatrics, addicts
and alcoholics. Some of these programs require a great deal of treatment skill, equipment and funding, and may not be able to be
financed by a single county. In fact, they may be best handled centrally, with special funding provided by the state. If these services were
provided in regional centers, the counties could contract for the
amount of service they need and wasteful duplication of services could
be avoided. 152 If any of these contingencies were to emerge, dual funding could again result. Thus, while a single funding system has practical appeal, it simply may not be administratively possible.
When all of the numerous interests discussed above are balanced,
the end result of a cost-benefit analysis for the state is unclear. The
152. California provides services to the mentally retarded using such a system. B.
Barkovich, supra note 62, at 61-64.
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state's responsibility for patient treatment is ambiguous, although it
maintains final authority and control over the approval of the county's
plans. It is clear that the unified services plan will cost more and
probably will not result in simplified administrative procedures. The
state will, however, be able to make its influence felt when the regulations governing the administration of LUSA are drafted. Presently,
the state has set up eight committees to develop these regulations. 53
Although the results of the committees' investigations are not complete, the committee topics cover the major areas of potential conflict.
It is therefore to be expected that the committees will eliminate some
of the present ambiguities during the course of drafting the regulations.
C. The Agencies' Interest
Presently, most service agencies are responsible to their specific
clients and the county in which they operate. LUSA makes the state
part of the planning process and thus creates a direct state-agency relationship. The agency benefits from a single service system, because
it becomes more likely that the agency will receive appropriate referrals and will be able to make referrals when its clients need other
services. However, there are a number of potential disadvantages for
the agencies under LUSA.
In New York City, a group of agencies organized as the Coalition
of Voluntary Mental Health and Mental Retardation Agencies, Inc.,
has indicated its support for the concept of unified services but has
objected to a number of the law's provisions because
(a) The capitation funding formula will quickly result in increased
costs to hard pressed localities and eleemosynary sources.
(b) There is no specificity with regard to the role of voluntary
agencies, consumers, and other critical factors in unified services
planning.
(c) There are no assurances of maintaining the qualitative levels of
service offered currently through voluntary programs.
153. The committees' topics include: the process of planning, contents of plan,
budgeting process, relationship with other agencies, consumer participation, relationship
with health planning agencies, informational systems and innovative organizational arrangements. See REPORT OF THE NEw YORK COALITION OF VOLUNTARY MENTAL

HEALTH AGENCIES, INC. (1973).
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(d) There are no assurances that special groups such as childen will
receive priority in allocations.
(e) The concept can be implemented through administrative fiat,
for a future date when it has
saving the legislative mandate
54
been thoroughly tested.'
The Coalition has began extensive task force study of the legislation. Programs of the task force indicate that its primary focus will be
precisely defining the concepts embodied in the bill and detailing the
procedures that should be followed in providing service. It suggests developing time tables and deadlines for planning within the Act and
creating model contracts and evaluative criteria for the counties to
use if they wish.
A serious and legitimate concern of these agencies is the protection of the confidentiality and privacy of their clients. They are especially concerned about the effect of the Unified Services Information
System which has been suggested as an adjunct to the unified services
program and has been put into effect as a pilot program in a few
agencies.
The proposed USIS is a management information (cost-analysis) system conceived by the state DMH to facilitate unified services financial and administrative planning. For "all local mental health retardation and alcoholism facilities license, approved and/or funded
by the NYS DMH," it would collect data on program services, professional allocation of time, patient visits, and finances (in addition
to all present reporting requirements) .'rr
In summarizing the impact of the system, the Coalition notes it
will increase the number of administrative reporting forms by six
or eight thus increasing the cost of administration. They further indicate that the basic focus of the forms is quantitative and that the results may well be an unrepresentative and non-qualitative evaluation
which does not reflect the full value of the program. The system may
not even represent the variety of services offered because it requires
that the reporting be done on the basis of preestablished categories
which may not fully describe the program offered. The Coalition also
154. Letter from Coalition of Voluntary Agencies, Inc. to Governor Nelson Rockefeller, May 3, 1973.

155. See NEw YORK COALITION OF VOLUNTARY MENTAL HEALTH AGENCIEs, INC.,
THE PROPOSED NYS DM1- "UNIFIED SERVICES INFORMATION SYSTEM,": PROVISIONS
AND GENERAL IMPACT ON LOCAL PROVIDERS OF SERVICE I (draft of Nov. 1, 1973).
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feels that the forms will result in a regimentation of clinical time.
However, the most serious problem with the system is the centralization of so much confidential information and the concomitant potential for endangering the privacy of clients.
The main thrust of the agency's "countersuggestion" is that the
Department of Mental Hygiene should use its administrative power to
develop a limited number of experimental programs in order to solve
the administrative problems before asking all groups to make sweeping changes which may be quite unsuccessful.
D. The Patients' Interest
The concept of unified services may offer a great deal to the person seeking help. If the system is properly coordinated, a person should
be able to seek initial help at any agency or facility in the system. The
agency would then either provide service or refer the patient to the
part of the system most appropriate to his needs. The single funding
approach should minimize the jurisdictional disputes which resulted
from interagency competition for funding. If the services are carefully
evaluated duplication of effort could be avoided, thereby freeing funds
to be used to provide a wider variety of services. The only real disadvantage for the patient may be an increase in the cost of service in
the form of increased taxes. The potential gains for the patient are,
however, entirely contingent on the county, state and agencies achieving their programming goals and fully implementing their programs.
CONCLUSIONS

LUSA is a legislative attempt to change the mental health delivery
system by changing its financial structure. A law, especially one with
the potential for financial loss or gain, may have a potent effect on its
constituents. This Comment has indicated a number of the potential
strengths and weaknesses of the law and some of the vested interests
which may be advanced or thwarted as the unified services program
is developed.
As noted in the beginning of this section, a change in the mental
health system will necessarily disrupt the present "ecology" of the organizational programs and individual practices. 15 6 In order to bring
156. E. BARDACH, supra note 2, at 184.
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about a basic change there must be a reallocation of the benefits of
the system so that at least some parties will be better off and none will
be worse off. 157 As the law is presently structured it is not possible to
predict whether the necessary allocation could take place. The unified services system introduces a number of uncertainties which must
be resolved either through a redrafting of the law to make it more
specific, such as is found in the detailed approach of the S-DA, or
through precise regulations which represent the input of all parties involved-state, county, agencies and patients. Without such consideration in determining the plans for implementation of the concept, the
financial incentive is not likely to be meaningful and the law will fail
to bring about the desired social effects. The failure will not be due to
a lack of "independent assent" to a unification of the mental health
system, but a lack of consensus about its administrative approach
which has an equally important role to play in social change, and the
success of the law.
LINDA CONNOR KANE
157. Id.

